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DETERMINING LIMITATION PERIODS FOR
ACTIONS ARISING UNDER
FEDERAL STATUTES
by Neil Sobol
IME limitations for causes of action are an integral part of the Amer-
ican system of law.' These limitations define time periods following
the accrual of the right of action in which a litigant must assert his
claim. 2 If the litigant fails to commence his suit within the specified time
period, the court will generally deny relief.3 Given that failure to commence
a suit before the limitation period has expired may deny an injured party
relief and allow a wrongdoer to escape without providing such relief, liti-
gants must be able to determine the limitation periods that will apply to their
particular causes of action. 4
For state created rights of action litigants can generally predict the appli-
cable limitation periods. The court, whether state or federal, simply applies
the limitation period that the state legislature has specified for the particular
cause of action. 5 If no specific state statute of limitation exists for the cause
of the action, the court applies the appropriate general statute of limitation.
6
For federally created rights of action, the determination of the appropriate
statute of limitation is not always as simple. While many congressional stat-
utes provide specific statutes of limitation, 7 many other federal statutes do
not have such limitation periods.8 Unlike the states, the federal government
1. Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 342 (1805) (not providing a limitation period
"would be utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws").
2. Special Project, Time Bars in Specialized Federal Common Law. Federal Rights of
Action and State Statutes of Limitations, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1011, 1015 (1980).
3. Id. Under certain circumstances, however, a court may suspend or toll the limitation
period. See generally 5 F. POORE & E. KOEBER, CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE
§§ 15.526-.529 (3d ed. 1968) (discusses circumstances in which a court may toll the limitation
period).
4. The ability reasonably to predict the limitation is also important to the defendant, the
judicial system, and society in general. See infra notes 19-30 and accompanying text.
5. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 103-09 (1945).
6. See Burleson v. Mead Johnson & Co., 331 F. Supp. 710, 711-12 (N.D. Tex. 1971);
Note, Limitation Borrowing in Federal Courts, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1127 (1979). General
statutes of limitation constitute catch-all provisions that apply when no other statutes provid-
ing specific limitation periods apply. See, e.g., Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-550 (1982) (four
years); HAW. REV. STAT. § 657-1 (1985) (six years); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 16.051 (Vernon 1986) (four years).
7. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1982) (Clayton Act) (four years); 17 U.S.C. § 507 (1982)
(Copyright Act) (three years); 35 U.S.C. § 286 (1982) (Patent Act) (six years); 45 U.S.C. § 56
(1982) (Federal Employers' Liability Act) (three years).
8. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-760h (1982) (Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act); 18
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has not specified general statutes of limitation that apply to all situations in
which the federal statute does not contain a limitation period. 9 As a result,
when a federal statute does not specify a limitation period the courts must
decide whether to apply a time restriction, and if so, which limitation period
to apply.
In the vast majority of cases in which no specified limitation periods exist
the federal courts have simply borrowed such periods from the laws of the
forum state.' 0 Under this borrowing approach litigants in different forum
states may face different statutes of limitation for the same federal cause of
action because of disparities in state statutes of limitation. I Such a borrow-
ing scheme, therefore, merely encourages forum shopping and fosters
nonuniformity and unpredictability for federal causes of action. 12 Further-
more, the forum rule may run counter to the reasonable expectations of the
parties if the cause of action occurs in a state other than the forum.' 3 Even
litigants in the same forum may face different statutes of limitation for the
same federal cause of action, since the choice of the state statute of limitation
depends on the court's characterization of the cause of action in a particular
case. Inconsistent characterizations result in the application of different state
statutes of limitation to the same federal right of action. 14 In a small minor-
ity of cases the Supreme Court has decided not to adopt the forum state
statutes, but instead has turned to other sources to define limitation peri-
ods. 15 Such an approach merely decreases the litigant's ability to predict the
limitation period that a federal court may apply in any given case.' 6 In sum-
mary, the present system's method of determining limitation periods for
federal actions when the federal statute does not specify a statute of limita-
tion has resulted in inconsistency and confusion in the federal courts. 17
This Comment first discusses the purposes for providing statutes of limita-
U.S.C. § 1964 (1982) (civil enforcement action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act); 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982) (Labor Management Relations Act); 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) (civil action for deprivation of rights).
9. Hill, State Procedural Law in Federal Nondiversity Litigation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 66,
78 (1955); Note, supra note 6, at 1127. Congress, however, has established a general five-year
limitation period for noncapital criminal offenses. 18 U.S.C § 3282 (1982).
10. See, e.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279 (1985) (apply New Mexico statute of
limitation); Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 492 (1980) (apply New York statute
of limitation); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 180-82 (1976) (apply Virginia statute of
limitation); see Special Project, supra note 2, at 1055; Note, supra note 6, at 1134.
11. Note, Disparities in Time Limitations on Federal Causes of Action, 49 YALE L.J. 738,
739 (1940).
12. Special Project, supra note 2, at 1013; Note, supra note 6, at 1136.
13. Hill, supra note 9, at 102 n.164.
14. Special Project, supra note 2, at 1072-75. The problem of inconsistent characterization
becomes especially evident in cases in which no state causes of action exist that are clearly
analogous to the federal causes of action. Id. at 1077-78.
15. See, e.g., Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff& Assocs., Inc., 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2767,
97 L. Ed. 2d 121, 133-34 (1987) (use limitation period from an analogous federal statute);
County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 240-44 (1985) (use no limitation
period); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169-72 (1983) (use limi-
tation period from an analogous federal statute); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396-
97 (1946) (use equitable doctrine of laches).
16. Note, supra note 11, at 741.
17. Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 667 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Few
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tion and the general factors involved in selecting limitation periods for
causes of action in federal courts. In light of the objectives of limitation peri-
ods, the Comment next analyzes the current approach of using the forum
state's limitation period to provide time restrictions for federal statutes that
do not specify such periods. This analysis concentrates on the development
of the forum state borrowing approach, as well as the problems inherent in
such a system. Next the Comment discusses the Supreme Court's and com-
mentators' suggested alternatives to the general approach. The Comment
presents the advantages and disadvantages of each of these alternatives. Fi-
nally, in light of the analysis of the present system and its alternatives, this
Comment offers several proposals to help create uniformity and certainty for
federal causes of action that do not specify limitation periods.
I. PURPOSES OF LIMITATION PERIODS
Limitation periods have always constituted an important part of the
American legal system.18 In enacting statutes of limitation legislators gener-
ally seek to protect the interests of three groups: potential defendants, the
courts, and society in general. 19 The protection of the interests of any one of
these groups often overlaps with the protection of the interests of one or both
of the other groups. 20 The primary purpose of statutes of limitation is to
provide fairness to potential defendants. 21 By specifying a time period after
which parties are no longer liable for specific causes of action, statutes of
limitation prevent parties from being subject to indefinite threats of lawsuits.
A party does not have to defend itself after long periods of time, when evi-
dence or witnesses may no longer be available. 22 Moreover, the specification
areas of the law stand in greater need of firmly defined, easily applied rules than does the
subject of periods of limitations.")
18. W. FERGUSON, THE STATUTES OF LIMITATION SAVING STATUTES 46 (1978). Fergu-
son has suggested that limitation periods "may be traced to ancient Greece or beyond and
through numerous societies that developed in the ancient world." 1d. at 7. At first statutes of
limitation applied solely to actions involving real property. Note, supra note 6, at 1129. The
early English statutes originally defined limitation periods based on the occurrence of a histori-
cal event, such as the coronation of a king. W. FERGUSON, supra, at 7. In 1540, however, the
English system adopted the modem approach to limitation periods by not only specifying a
fixed time interval in which a litigant must bring his suit following the occurrence of the cause
of action, but also by setting different time periods for different causes of action. In 1623 Eng-
land extended its use of statutes of limitation from real property actions to personal actions.
Special Project, supra note 2, at 1022 & n.62. The American colonies adopted the English
system and generally retained statutes of limitation after the American Revolution. W. FER-
GUSON, supra, at 46.
19. W. FERGUSON, supra note 18, at 40. At least one commentator has suggested that
another justification for limitation periods is that they encourage plaintiffs to bring suits
quickly. See Special Project, supra note 2, at 1018. But see W. FERGUSON, supra note 18, at 42
("If the only purpose of the statutes of limitation were to compel plaintiff to sue early or not at
all, without regard to the effect upon the public or the defendant, it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to rationally endorse such statutes.").
20. Special Project, supra note 2, at 1016.
21. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 473 (1975) (Marshall, J.,
concurring); W. FERGUSON, supra note 18, at 43; Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limi-
tations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1185 (1950) [hereinafter Developments in the Law].
22. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49
(1944).
19871
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of the limitation period serves as notice to a party of how long it should
preserve information that a court might consider as evidence if a plaintiff
were to bring suit prior to the expiration of the period. Finally, the expira-
tion of a limitation period provides a party with a period of repose. The
party can conduct its daily business without the fear of having to defend
against stale claims and unfair surprises.23
Statutes of limitation also serve to protect and benefit the judicial system.
Limitation periods help to preserve the integrity of the courts by ensuring
that such courts need not deal with claims that the plaintiff has simply
delayed until the parties have lost or destroyed evidence. 24 Stale claims hurt
the adversarial system by preventing a full examination of all relevant evi-
dence. 25 Limitation periods allow a court to concentrate its efforts on cases
in which evidence is still fresh and witnesses have not forgotten their exper-
iences. 26 Finally, as a matter of judicial convenience, limitation periods pre-
vent already overloaded court dockets from becoming worse and allow the
courts more effective allocation of their limited resources. 27
In addition to protecting the interests of the courts and defendants, stat-
utes of limitation serve to protect the interests of society in general. Statutes
of limitation help to preserve stability in commercial relations. After the ex-
piration of a limitation period potential creditors can feel secure in making
loans to and transacting with parties who, prior to the period's expiration,
stood as potentially bad credit risks because of the threat of lawsuits. 28 Lim-
itation periods appear especially important in claims involving property
rights. Such periods serve to protect the rights of bona fide purchasers who,
based on these limitation periods, can determine whether existing or poten-
tial claims on the property are still valid.29 Limitation periods, therefore,
help to preserve stability in the ownership of real property. 30
In summary, legislators design statutes of limitation to protect the inter-
ests of defendants, the courts, and society. Failure of a litigant to bring suit
within the specified limitation period will generally result in dismissal of an
otherwise valid claim. 3 1 Such a result may appear harsh in any particular
case since it may deny an injured party relief. The overall benefits, however,
23. Note, supra note 6, at 1128-29.
24. Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1895); Special Project, supra note 2, at
1017.
25. Special Project, supra note 2, at 1017.
26. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979); Order of R.R. Telegraphers v.
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944).
27. Note, Fair Representation by a Union: A Federal Right in Need of a Federal Statute of
Limitations, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 896, 903-04 (1983).
28. Note, supra note 6, at 1129.
29. Lewis v. Marshall, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 470, 477-78 (1831); Developments in the Law, supra
note 21, at 1186.
30. W. FERGUSON, supra note 18, at 41. Ferguson suggests that while protection of pub-
lic interest is a reasonable purpose for statutes of limitation in real property actions, this pur-
pose does not necessarily apply to personal actions. Id. He contends that in personal actions
the only public interest justification of statutes of limitation is the vague goal of having a final
resolution of controversies. Id.
31. See Special Project, supra note 2, at 1015. A court may toll or suspend a limitation
period. See supra note 3.
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of statutes of limitation generally outweigh their disadvantages. 32
II. FACTORS RELEVANT TO THE SELECTION OF LIMITATION PERIODS
The federal courts generally consider three factors in determining the ap-
propriate limitation period for a particular cause of action. These considera-
tions are: (1) whether the legislators have specified a federal statute of
limitation to apply to the cause of action; (2) whether the cause of action
arises from a federal or state created right; and (3) whether the courts, prior
to the merging of equity and law, 33 considered the action legal or equitable.
Through an analysis of these factors courts are able to determine whether a
limitation period should apply to a cause of action, and if so, whether federal
or state law should be the source for the period. 34
Generally, the most important consideration is whether the statute that
creates the cause of action explicitly provides a federal statute of limita-
tion.35 If Congress has declared that a certain limitation period should ap-
ply to a particular cause of action, then a federal court must apply that
period.3 6 Furthermore, under the supremacy clause 37 the congressionally
provided statute of limitation for a particular cause of action controls over
any conflicting state limitation period. 38 When the federal statute contains a
limitation period, therefore, the federal courts simply adopt that period.
Such an approach helps to ensure uniformity in federal law and thereby dis-
courages forum shopping by litigants seeking the forum with the most ad-
vantageous limitation period for a particular cause of action. 39
If Congress has not specified an applicable limitation period, the court
must examine the nature of the cause of action to determine the time restric-
32. See Lewis v. Marshall, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 470, 477 (1831) ("The best interests of society
require that causes of action should not be deferred an unreasonable time."); M'Cluny v. Sil-
liman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270, 278 (1830) (Statutes of limitation "rest upon sound policy, and
tend to the peace and welfare of society."); Bell v. Morrison, 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 351, 360 (1828)
(Story, J.) ("The statute of limitation is a wise and beneficial law . . . [that] afford[s] security
against stale demands, after the true state of the transaction may have been forgotten, or be
incapable of explanation, by reason of the death or removal of witnesses."). For capital of-
fenses, however, Congress has determined that limitation periods are not appropriate. 18
U.S.C. § 3281 (1982).
33. See FED. R. Civ. P. 2.
34. 2 J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 3.07[2] (2d ed. 1987).
35. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946); Developments in the Law, supra
note 21, at 1266; Special Project, supra note 2, at 1024.
36. Holmberg, 327 U.S. at 395; Blume & George, Limitations and the Federal Courts, 49
MICH. L. REV. 937, 939 (1951).
37. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made or which shall be made, under
the authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land .... ").
38. See Herget v. Central Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 324 U.S. 4, 9 (1945) (apply federal
limitation period instead of state period for action arising under the federal Bankruptcy Act);
Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33, 38-39 (1926) (federal limitation period controls over shorter
state period); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Burnette, 239 U.S. 199, 201 (1915) (federal limita-
tion period controls over longer state period); Special Project, supra note 2, at 1024.
39. McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 229-30 (1958) (Brennan, J.,
concurring). If the plaintiff raises the cause of action under the federal statute in a state rather
than a federal court, the express federal limitation period will bind the state court. 2 J. MOORE
& J. LUCAS, supra note 34, 3.07[2].
19871
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tion. 40 The sources from which a federal court will derive the limitation
period depend on whether the cause of action is a state or federally created
right and whether the court regards the action as legal or equitable.41 In
actions involving state created rights, the federal court must follow the state
statute of limitation for the particular action or a state general statute of
limitation if no specific limitation period applies.4 2 Such a rule applies to
diversity cases regardless of whether the court classifies the action as legal or
equitable. 43 The rationale suggesting the use of state statutes of limitation in
diversity cases is that the federal court merely acts as a state court enforcing
a state created right.44 State legislators have provided limitation periods
based on state interests in the state right; accordingly, federal courts are
bound to give deference to these state limitation periods.4 5 Moreover, the
rule of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 46 dictates that in cases in which a
federal court has jurisdiction based solely on diversity, the court must adopt
the forum state's choice of limitation periods.47
In an action involving federally created rights when no specified limitation
period exists, the requirements and policy considerations of Erie do not bind
a federal court.48 Instead of sitting merely as a court of the state, as it does
in diversity cases, 49 the federal court in nondiversity cases acts as part of the
national system and, therefore, possesses the ability to formulate federal
common law.50 Moreover, the rationale of using state statutes of limitation
40. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 394-96 (1946).
41. Id.; 2 J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, supra note 34, 3.07[2].
42. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. at 394; 2 J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, supra note 34,
3.07[2]. The courts may suspend or toll the limitation period. See supra note 3.
43. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 103-09 (1945); 2 J. MOORE & J. LUCAS,
supra note 34, 3.07[2]. As the Supreme Court explained in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446
U.S. 740 (1980), federal courts should provide litigants in diversity suits the same limitation
periods that they would receive in state court:
There is simply no reason why, in the absence of a controlling federal rule, an
action based on state law which concededly would be barred in the state courts
by the state statute of limitations should proceed through litigation to judgment
in federal court solely because of the fortuity that there is diversity of citizenship
between the litigants. The policies underlying diversity jurisdiction do not sup-
port such a distinction between state and federal plaintiffs, and Erie and its prog-
eny do not permit it.
Id. at 753.
44. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1945).
45. Id. In a conflict-of-laws case, however, this rationale breaks down since a court must
follow the forum statute of limitation period, subject to any forum borrowing provision, even if
the cause of action and all other relevant factors, except for the filing of suit, took place in
another state. A federal court sitting in diversity, therefore, will look to forum laws for stat-
utes of limitation rather than to the state where the cause of action arose. Wells v. Simonds
Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 516-17 (1953).
46. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
47. Id. at 78; see Wells, 345 U.S. at 517; 2 J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, supra note 34, 3.07[2].
48. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEX. L. REV.
657, 666 (1959). In addition, the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982), does not
require the federal courts in nondiversity cases to select state statutes of limitation. See infra
notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
49. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1945).
50. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1946). The Court stated that:
We do not have the duty of a federal court, sitting as it were as a court of a
State, to approximate as closely as may be State law in order to vindicate with-
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does not apply to federally created rights. 5' State legislators design statutes
of limitation based on state, rather than federal, interests. 52 Neither legal
mandate nor policy considerations, therefore, require that federal courts ap-
ply state limitation periods in actions involving federally created rights. 53
The final consideration that a court looks to in determining the applicable
limitation period is whether the court considers the action legal or equita-
ble. 54 Although separate courts of equity and law no longer exist, the dis-
tinction between legal and equitable actions may still become important to a
court trying to determine limitation periods for federal statutes. 55 The deter-
mination of whether an action is equitable or legal may affect whether the
court will allow the equitable defense of laches to govern a particular case. 56
In summary, courts facing the problem of determining limitation periods
for a given cause of action apply various standards. If Congress specifies a
limitation period, that period controls. If Congress does not provide a pe-
riod, the federal courts must examine the nature of the underlying cause of
action. If the cause of action results from a state created right, state law
binds the courts. If, on the other hand, the cause of action arises from a
federal statute that does not specify a limitation period, the courts are not
legally bound to follow state law.
III. THE GENERAL APPROACH: BORROWING A
STATE LIMITATION PERIOD
Although federal courts are not legally bound to adopt state limitation
periods for federal causes of action that do not specify limitation periods,
historically they have borrowed such periods from states. 57 Moreover, mod-
ern federal courts generally continue to follow this traditional approach.5 8
out discrimination a right derived solely from a State. We have the duty of fed-
eral courts, sitting as national courts throughout the country, to apply their own
principles in enforcing an equitable right created by Congress.
Id. at 395.
51. Id. at 394.
52. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977).
53. Id.; Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. at 394-95. While not bound to select the forum
state's limitation periods, the general practice is to adopt the state period as long as that period
appears consistent with federal policy. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985).
54. Holmberg, 327 U.S. at 395-96; 2 J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, supra note 34, 3.07[2].
55. Holmberg, 327 U.S. at 395-96; 5 F. POORE & E. KOEBER, supra note 3, § 15.522. The
distinction between equity and actions at law does not matter for diversity cases. See supra
note 43 and accompanying text.
56. Holmberg, 327 U.S. at 395-97 (apply doctrine of laches in a traditional equity case).
The Supreme Court has not resolved the question of whether it will apply the doctrine of
laches in actions traditionally known as actions at law. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian
Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 244-45 & n. 16 (1985). For a discussion of the use of the laches defense in
cases arising under federal statutes, see infra notes 178-194 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 468 (1947) (apply Kentucky statute of
limitation); McClaine v. Rankin, 197 U.S. 154, 158 (1905) (apply Washington statute of limita-
tion); Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 621 (1895) (apply Massachusetts statute of limita-
tion); M'Cluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270, 277-78 (1830) (apply Ohio statute of
limitation).
58. See, e.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279-80 (1985) (apply New Mexico statute of
limitation); Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 492 (1980) (apply New York statute
1987]
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In only a small minority of cases have the federal courts refused to apply the
state limitation period in actions when no federal statute of limitation ex-
isted. 59 This section presents the development of the state borrowing ap-
proach and an evaluation of its advantages and disadvantages in light of the
purposes of limitation periods.
A. Development of the General Approach
The state borrowing rule stems from an early misunderstanding of the
Rules of Decision Act.60 In M'Cluny v. Silliman 61 the Supreme Court first
dealt with the issue of determining an applicable limitation period for a fed-
erally created right that did not specify a limitation period. The Court held
that section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 178962 required that the federal court
adopt state limitation periods for federal statutes in which Congress failed to
specify limitation periods. 6 3 Fifty-five years later, the Court in Campbell v.
Haverhill 64 held that while section 34 now commonly known as the Rules of
Decision Act, generally required application of the state statute of limitation
for actions in which Congress failed to specify a limitation period, under
certain circumstances courts need not adopt state law.65 Specifically the
Court declared that if the state statute of limitation appeared discriminatory
with respect to the federal cause of action or if it imposed an unreasonable
burden on the parties involved, then the state limitation period would not
apply. 66 If a court found the state limitation neither discriminatory nor bur-
densome, then, according to Campbell, the Rules of Decision Act mandated
application of the state period. 67
Johnson v. Davis 68 illustrates a discriminatory state statute of limitation.
In Davis the Fourth Circuit refused to apply a one-year statute of limitation
that the state had specified should apply to a cause of action arising under
section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code.69 The court found that
the one-year period discriminated against the federal cause of action because
of limitation); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 180-82 (1976) (apply Virginia statute of
limitation).
59. See, e.g., Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff& Assocs., Inc., 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2767,
97 L. Ed. 2d 121, 133-34 (1987) (use limitation period from an analogous federal statute);
County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 239-44 (1985) (use no limitation
period); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169-72 (1983) (use limi-
tation period from an analogous federal statute); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396-
97 (1946) (use equitable doctrine of laches).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982). The Rules of Decision Act provides: "The laws of the sev-
eral states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress
otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts
of the United States, in cases where they apply." Id.
61. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270 (1830).
62. Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(1982)).
63. M'Cluny, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 276-77.
64. 155 U.S. 610 (1895).
65. Id. at 614-15.
66. Id. at 615.
67. Id. at 615-16.
68. 582 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1978).
69. Id. at 1318-19; see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
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comparable state claims had two-year limitation periods.70 The relevant test
for determining whether a limitation period is discriminatory, therefore,
considers whether the state provides a shorter limitation period for a federal
cause of action than it does for an analogous state cause of action.
71
Subsequent cases have also developed the unreasonable burden exception
specified in Campbell.72  In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency 73 the
Supreme Court declared that federal courts may adopt state law only if the
state law stands consistent with the underlying policies of the federal cause
of action.74 While Railway Express dealt with what law should govern the
tolling of a statute of limitation, the Supreme Court has expressly extended
this doctrine to apply to the choice of limitation periods.7 5 In Occidental
Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC7 6 the Court explained that the rationale behind
this exception is that state legislatures base their limitation periods on state
rather than national interests; therefore, a federal court may deny applica-
tion of a state limitation period if it appears contrary to a federal policy or
interest. 77 The courts, therefore, have interpreted the unreasonably burden-
some exception to include state statutes of limitation that conflict or stand
inconsistent with the policies surrounding the federally created right.
78
While Campbell described exceptions to the state borrowing approach, the
Supreme Court did not recognize until 1946 that neither the Rules of Deci-
sion Act nor Erie required federal courts to apply state limitation periods for
actions arising under federal statutes that did not contain such periods.
79
Instead, the federal courts had discretion to determine whether to apply
state law to fill gaps left in federal law.80 Subsequent cases indicated that in
adopting state statutes of limitation, the federal courts were doing so as a
matter of federal rather than state law.8'
70. Id. The analogous state claims constituted personal injury actions. Id.
71. Special Project, supra note 2, at 1049.
72. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977); Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 465 (1975); UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S.
696, 706 (1966).
73. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
74. Id. at 465.
75. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 240 (1985); Occidental Life
Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977). For a discussion of whether federal or state law
governs the tolling of limitation periods, see infra note 92.
76. 432 U.S. 355 (1977).
77. Id. at 367.
78. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266 (1985); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Na-
tion, 470 U.S. 226, 240 (1985).
79. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1946); see DelCostello v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 159 n.13 (1983).
80. Holmberg, 327 U.S. at 395; see Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363,
367 (1943) ("In the absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal courts to
fashion the governing rule of law according to their own standards.").
81. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 159 n.13 (1983); UAW
v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 701 (1966). In a recent Supreme Court case, however,
one Justice argued that the courts should adopt state limitation periods as a matter of state
law. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff& Assocs., Inc., 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2771, 97 L. Ed. 2d
121, 138-39 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia indicated, however, that precedent
has prevented the application of such a rule. Id.
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Although neither Erie nor the Rules of Decision Act require that federal
courts adopt state limitation periods, the federal courts continue to borrow
state statutes of limitation.8 2 The general rule, which remains in effect, cre-
ates a presumption in favor of the use of forum state law for actions in which
Congress has not specified time restrictions. 83 Given the exceptions de-
scribed in Campbell, however, such a presumption does not appear
absolute .84
B. Evaluation of the General Approach
The state borrowing approach, which has existed since at least 1830,85
posseses some apparent advantages. This approach ensures that a court will
use limitation periods for actions arising under federal statutes that do not
contain any time restrictions. 86 Moreover, litigants, society, and the judicial
system also benefit from the approach, because they can reasonably predict
that the courts will generally continue to use state law as the major source of
limitation periods. 87 In addition, given that the courts have used the ap-
proach for over 150 years, the assumption that the failure of Congress to
specify a limitation period suggests the congressional intent that courts
adopt a state statute of limitation seems reasonable.88 Finally, a comparison
of the comprehensive coverage of state statutes of limitation, both specific
and general, relative to the sparsely scattered federal statutes of limitation
indicates that state rather than federal law may provide a better source for
determining the appropriate statute of limitation for a given cause of
action.89
Despite these apparent advantages, the present system of borrowing state
limitation periods also contains some important disadvantages. The major
problems associated with the state borrowing approach consist of
nonuniformity and inconsistency in the federal court system.90 Any ap-
82. See, e.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279-80 (1985) (apply New Mexico statute of
limitation); Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 492 (1980) (apply New York statute
of limitation); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 180-82 (1976) (apply Virginia statute of
limitation).
83. See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158 (1983); Occi-
dental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977); UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383
U.S. 696, 703-04 (1966).
84. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 240 (1985); Special Project,
supra note 2, at 1043.
85. M'Cluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270, 276-77 (1830).
86. Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 616-18 (1895).
87. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-76 (1985). Given the problems of inconsistent
characterization and use of borrowing provisions, however, knowledge of the source of the
limitation periods does not necessarily guarantee easy prediction of a court's choice of a spe-
cific limitation period. See infra notes 92-153 and accompanying text.
88. Special Project, supra note 2, at 1044-45; Note, supra note 6, at 1147.
89. See Special Project, supra note 2, at 1081. In certain cases, however, federal law may
provide a clearer analogy than available state law. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff
& Assocs., Inc., 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2764, 97 L. Ed. 2d 121, 130 (1987); DelCostello v. Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 172 (1983). For a discussion regarding the use of
limitation periods from analogous federal statutes, see infra notes 195-218 and accompanying
text.
90. Special Project, supra note 2, at 1013.
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proach that relies exclusively on state law as guidance subjects such ap-
proach to the inevitable differences among the various states. Each state
generally possesses a unique set of statutes of limitation. 9' Moreover, the
failure of federal district and appellate courts to characterize federal causes
of action and to use borrowing provisions for causes of action arising outside
the forum state in a consistent fashion compounds the problem by creating
differences within the states, as well as conflicts between the states.92
Inconsistent characterizations are the primary source of uncertainty under
the state borrowing approach.93 The way a court chooses to characterize a
particular federal cause of action controls the court's selection of an analo-
gous state claim, and thus determines which state limitation period a federal
court will decide to borrow. 94 For example, if a court characterizes a partic-
ular federal claim as a breach of contract action, then most likely the action
will have a different limitation period than if the court had characterized the
claim as a tort action. 95
A problem with characterization arises in that several federal causes of
action do not have any readily apparent analogous state causes of action.96
91. Note, Federal Borrowing of Arkansas Statutes of Limitations in Enforcement of the
Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes, 31 ARK. L. REV. 692, 697 (1978); see, e.g., CAL. CIv.
PROC. CODE § 337 (West 1982) (four-year limitation period for action on contract); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 516.120(1) (Vernon 1952) (five-year limitation period for action on contract); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 893.43 (West 1983) (six-year limitation period for action on contract).
92. Special Project, supra note 2, at 1065, 1099-1101. An additional problem that the
courts have faced in borrowing state limitation periods is whether the adoption of a state's
limitation period requires the court to adopt the state's guidelines related to the adoption of
such a period. Traditionally, the problem has arisen in determining whether a court that
adopts a state's limitation period must also adopt the state's rules for tolling that period. John-
son v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975); Special Project, supra note
2, at 1084.
Relying on the general principle that the length of the limitation period clearly relates to the
issue of tolling and the direction in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) to look to state law for guidance,
the Supreme Court has held that state law governs the tolling of limitation periods in actions
arising under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1982). Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268-69 (1985);
Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 662 (1983); Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S.
478, 484-85 (1980); Johnson, 421 U.S. at 463-64. The state tolling provisions will not apply,
however, if such provisions appear contrary to the underlying policies of the federal cause of
action. Chardon, 462 U.S. at 657; Johnson, 421 U.S. at 464-66.
The Seventh Circuit, however, has indicated that the rule that state tolling provisions govern
when a court adopts a state's limitation period may not apply in cases arising under federal
acts other than 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1982). Sentry Corp. v. Harris, 802 F.2d 229, 235-40
(7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1624, 95 L. Ed. 2d 199 (1987). In Sentry Corp. the
court distinguished civil rights cases due to the direction in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) to use
state law and the absence of an applicable federal tolling provision. 802 F.2d at 235-40. The
court held that in an action under a federal security law, in which no express federal limitation
period exists, state law provides the limitation period, but federal law determines whether the
plaintiffs commenced the suit for purposes of tolling the limitation period. Id. at 233.
93. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271-75 (1985); Comment, Statutes of Limitations in
Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 1976 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 97, 98-102.
94. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271-75 (1985). Characterization would also con-
trol the court's selection of an analogous federal claim. See infra note 217 and accompanying
text.
95. Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-576 (1987) (six-year limitation period for contract
action) with id. § 52-577 (three-year limitation period for tort action).
96. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2764-65,
97 L. Ed. 2d 121, 130-32 (1987) (no clear state analogy for civil enforcement action under the
19871
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As a result, federal courts often possess considerable discretion in character-
izing a particular cause of action for purposes of determining the most
appropriate limitation period.97 The traditional state borrowing approach,
which generally limits a court's selection to limitation periods of the forum
state, prevents a court from borrowing a potentially more appropriate limita-
tion period from another state. 98 Moreover, the federal courts complicate
these problems by inconsistently relying on state law,99 federal law, 1°° or
both in the characterization process.10' Finally, even if all courts utilized
federal law to characterize the cause of action, inconsistencies would still
exist since the courts emphasize different factors in determining limitation
periods. While some courts base their characterization solely on the specific
facts alleged or remedy sought in a particular case, 10 2 other courts look to
the statutory language of the federal act or the effect that the characteriza-
tion will have on the federal policies underlying the federal act.t0 3 Conflict-
ing responses to the question of which law should govern the
characterization process and which factors are important to that process
contribute to the problems of inconsistent characterizations. Such inconsis-
tent characterizations between, and especially within, the circuits create
needless uncertainty and unpredictability in the federal court system. 104
In Wilson v. Garcia 105 the Supreme Court sought a solution to the
problems of inconsistent characterization of federal civil rights claims arising
under section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code. '0 6 Prior to this case
the federal courts had inconsistently adopted limitation periods for civil
rights claims under section 1983 by analogizing to at least eight different
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act); Special Project, supra note 2, at 1077-
78 (states may possess no clear analogies for civil rights acts, national labor laws, and claims
for damages implied under the Constitution).
97. See, e.g., Howard v. Aluminum Workers Int'l Union, 589 F.2d 771, 774 (4th Cir.
1978) (characterize action under Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 411 (1982), as a personal injury action); Dantagnan v. I.L.A. Local 1418, 496 F.2d 400, 401-
03 (5th Cir. 1974) (characterize similar action as a quasi-contract action); Sewell v. Grand
Lodge, 445 F.2d 545, 549-50 (5th Cir. 1971) (characterize similar action as a tort action), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1024 (1972).
98. Note, supra note 11, at 738-40. Under a borrowing statute a court may borrow the
limitation period of the state where the cause of action arose. Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461,
464-68 (1947); Note, supra note 6, at 1139-40. Such borrowing provisions, however, appear
inconsistent and may not apply if the plaintiff is a resident of the forum or the foreign limita-
tion period is longer than the forum's period. See infra notes 147-162 and accompanying text.
99. Dantagnan v. I.L.A. Local 1418, 496 F.2d 400, 402-03 (5th Cir. 1974).
100. Howard v. Aluminum Workers Int'l Union, 589 F.2d 771, 773-74 (4th Cir. 1978).
101. Compare Butler v. Local Union 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442, 446 (8th
Cir. 1975) (use federal law for characterization) with Sandobal v. Armour & Co., 429 F.2d 249,
252-54 (8th Cir. 1970) (use state law for characterization), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975).
See Special Project, supra note 2, at 1057-66.
102. See Dantagnan v. I.L.A. Local 1418, 496 F.2d 400, 401-02 (5th Cir. 1974); Sandobal,
429 F.2d at 256-57.
103. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2763-64, 97 L.
Ed. 2d 121, 129 (1987); Howard v. Aluminum Workers Int'l Union, 589 F.2d 771, 774 (4th
Cir. 1978); Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331, 338 (7th Cir. 1977).
104. Special Project, supra note 2, at 1065-67, 1072-75.
105. 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
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sources of limitation periods.' 0 7 Specifically these sources included state lim-
itation periods for liability created by statute, 10 8 personal injury actions,'0 9
intentional torts, 10 contract actions, I1  violation of state civil rights provi-
sions, 112 actions against public officials,' ' 3 general state limitation periods
that are applicable to causes of action that do not specify such periods, 
114
and specific state statutes governing federal civil rights actions." 5 In addi-
tion, the federal courts inconsistently decided cases regarding whether fed-
eral or state law should control the characterization 1 6 and what factors a
court should use in determining whether to borrow a given statute of limita-
tion. 117 Commentators had long criticized the federal courts for the incon-
sistencies in the area of civil rights, 1 8 but not until Garcia did the Supreme
Court develop a uniform characterization rule for actions arising under sec-
tion 1983.119
The Supreme Court in Garcia began by answering the question whether
federal or state law should govern the characterization of section 1983
claims. The Court concluded that under section 1988120 the federal courts
107. See generally Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 643-48 (10th Cir. 1984) (discusses the
disparate ways that the circuits have characterized § 1983 claims), aff'd, 471 U.S. 261 (1985);
Annotation, What Statute of Limitations is Applicable to Civil Rights Action Brought Under 42
USCS § 1983, 45 A.L.R. FED. 548 (1979) (lists the many ways that the courts have character-
ized claims under § 1983 for purposes of determining limitation periods).
108. Keating v. Carey, 706 F.2d 377, 381-82 (2d Cir. 1983); Wagh v. Dennis, 677 F.2d 666,
667 (8th Cir. 1982); Major v. Arizona State Prison, 642 F.2d 311, 312 (9th Cir. 1981).
109. Garcia, 731 F.2d at 651; McCausland v. Mason County Bd. of Educ., 649 F.2d 278,
279 (4th Cir. 1981); Rubin v. O'Koren, 644 F.2d 1023, 1025 (5th Cir. Unit B May 1981).
110. Suthoffv. Yazoo County Indus. Dev. Corp., 722 F.2d 133, 136 (5th Cir. 1983); Gash-
gai v. Leibowitz, 703 F.2d 10, 12-13 (1st Cir. 1983); Hess v. Eddy, 689 F.2d 977, 980 (11 th Cir.
1982).
111. White v. United Parcel Serv., 692 F.2d 1, 2-3 (5th Cir. 1982); Hansbury v. Regents of
the Univ., 596 F.2d 944, 949 n.15 (10th Cir. 1979); Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 590 F.2d 470,
476-77 (3d Cir. 1978).
112. Burns v. Sullivan, 619 F.2d 99, 106-07 (1st Cir. 1980).
113. Buford v. Tremayne, 747 F.2d 445, 447-48 (8th Cir. 1984).
114. McKay v. Hammock, 730 F.2d 1367, 1370 (10th Cir. 1984); Perri v. Aytch, 724 F.2d
362, 368 (3d Cir. 1983); Morrell v. City of Picayune, 690 F.2d 469, 469-70 (5th Cir. 1982);
Branchcomb v. Brewer, 683 F.2d 251, 255 (8th Cir. 1982).
115. Loiseau v. Department of Human Resources, 558 F. Supp. 521, 526-27 (D. Or. 1983);
Kompara v. Board of Regents, 548 F. Supp. 537, 539 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
116. Compare Shouse v. Pierce County, 559 F.2d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 1977) (uses federal
law for characterization of § 1983 claim) with Ingram v. Steven Robert Corp., 547 F.2d 1260,
1260-63 (5th Cir. 1977) (uses state law for characterization of § 1983 claim); see Special Pro-
ject, supra note 2, at 1059-62.
117. Compare Garmon v. Foust, 668 F.2d 400, 406 (8th Cir. 1982) (look to the source of
the cause of action) with Burns v. Sullivan, 619 F.2d 99, 105-07 (1st Cir. 1980) (look to the
specific facts pleaded).
118. See Biehler, Limiting the Right to Sue. The Civil Rights Dilemma, 33 DRAKE L. REV.
1, 34 (1983); Special Project, supra note 2, at 1067-70; Note, supra note 93, at 97-98; Note,
supra note 91, at 704-05; Note, A Limitation on Actions for Deprivation of Federal Rights, 68
COLUM. L. REV. 763, 773 (1968) [hereinafter Note, A Limitation on Actions]; Note, A Call For
Uniformity: Statutes of Limitation in Federal Civil Rights Actions, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 61, 67-
69 (1979) [hereinafter Note, A Call for Uniformity].
119. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275-76 (1985).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). Section 1988 provides:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters .. for the protection of all persons
in the United States in their civil rights, ... shall be exercised and enforced in
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must use federal law to characterize the cause of action for purposes of de-
termining limitation periods. 121 Having determined that federal law should
control characterization, the Court moved to the issue of what factors
should determine the applicable limitation period. The Court held that in-
stead of analyzing the particular facts of each section 1983 case in order to
select the appropriate limitation period, the better method characterizes all
section 1983 claims in the same manner. 22 Specifically, the Court declared
that all federal courts should characterize section 1983 claims as personal
injury actions.123 While such an approach does not create a uniform federal
limitation period, it does establish a much needed uniform characterization
process for section 1983 claims. Such an approach possesses the potential to
create uniformity and certainty within the circuits.124
In Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc. 125 the Court,
relying on its analysis developed in Garcia, recently adopted a uniform fed-
eral characterization process for civil enforcement actions arising under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). 126 Prior to
Malley-Duff the courts had inconsistently characterized RICO actions. 127
In Malley-Duff the Court held that given the " 'garden variety' ,,128 of
potential acts that could establish a RICO cause of action and that RICO
actions stood unknown at common law, a uniform statute of limitation was
necessary to alleviate "intolerable 'uncertainty and time-consuming
litigation.' ",129
While Garcia and Malley-Duff should help reduce the problems of incon-
sistency and confusion in civil rights cases under section 1983 and in civil
conformity with the laws of the United States ... but in all cases where they are
not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish
suitable remedies and punish offenses . . . the common law, as modified and
changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having
jurisdiction ... is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitu-
tion and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said
courts ....
Id.
121. Garcia, 471 U.S. at 268-71 & n.22.
122. Id. at 272-76.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 275. In her dissent Justice O'Connor argued that the Court should not charac-
terize all § 1983 claims in the same manner. Id. at 280.
125. 107 S. Ct. 2759, 97 L. Ed. 2d 121 (1987).
126. Id. at 2763-64, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 129-30. Congress has codified the provision for RICO
civil enforcement actions at 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982).
127. Compare Tellis v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 805 F.2d 741, 744 (7th Cir.
1986) (uniform characterization of all civil RICO actions) with Silverberg v. Thomson McKin-
non Sec., Inc., 787 F.2d 1079, 1083 (6th Cir. 1986) (characterize civil RICO actions on a case-
by-case method based on the particular facts alleged and the legal theories presented).
128. 107 S. Ct. at 2763, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 129. The Court indicated that it could analogize the
potential acts creating RICO claims to a number of state actions including but not limited to
breach of contract, unfair competition, and tortious interference with business relations. Id.
129. Id. at 2764, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 129 (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 272 (1985)).
Unlike in Garcia, the Court in Malley-Duff found that a federal statute, the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1982), provided a better analogy than any state statute. Malley-Duff, 107 S. Ct. at
2764, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 130. For a discussion of the federal borrowing approach, see infra notes
195-218 and accompanying text.
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RICO claims, such problems still exist for the numerous other federal stat-
utes for which the Supreme Court has not declared a uniform characteriza-
tion process. 130 The characterization problem appears especially evident in
cases arising under the national labor acts.' 3 ' In UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal
Corp. 132 the Supreme Court specifically refused to adopt a uniform federal
characterization for actions arising under section 301 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act. 133 The Court argued that although characterization
ultimately became a matter of federal law, federal courts could adopt state
characterizations as long as such characterizations did not conflict with fed-
eral labor policy. 134 Since Hoosier the courts have inconsistently applied
state and federal law characterizations in labor cases. 135 Moreover, different
courts have examined different factors in determining what limitation peri-
ods should apply in these cases. 136 The problems of inconsistency and un-
certainty in the present system of characterization will not disappear unless
the Supreme Court or Congress specifies uniform rules for characteriza-
tion.137 Inconsistent characterizations make appeals more likely as litigants
will appeal in the hope of obtaining a characterization of the cause of action
that has a more favorable limitation period. 13 8 Inconsistent characterizations
and differences in state law also create nonuniformity in the federal system.
Litigants in different as well as the same forum state may face different limi-
tation periods for the same federal cause of action. 139 Such an approach
only encourages forum shopping and fosters a feeling of unfairness in the
federal system. Plaintiffs who meet the jurisdictional and venue require-
ments of a forum state with a relatively favorable limitation period for a
particular cause of action' 4° possess an advantage over plaintiffs who sue
under the same federal statute but lack either the resources or venue and
jurisdictional contacts to bring suit in the more favorable forum. 141 This
nonuniform system runs counter to the express objectives of the federal
130. See Special Project, supra note 2, at 1071.
131. Id. at 1062-63; Note, supra note 27, at 897-99; see 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1982) (Labor
Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act); Id. §§ 401-531 (Labor Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act).
132. 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
133. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
134. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 701-04 (1966).
135. Compare Butler v. Local Union 823, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 514 F.2d 442, 446-47
(8th Cir. 1975) (use federal characterization) with Sandobal v. Armour & Co., 429 F.2d 249,
252-54 (8th Cir. 1970) (use state characterization), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975).
136. Compare Butler, 514 F.2d at 447-48 (8th Cir. 1975) (look at federal interests) with De
Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 285-87 (1st Cir. 1970) (look
at nature of statutory right).
137. Special Project, supra note 2, at 1078-82.
138. Id. at 1075-76.
139. Id. at 1015; see also Note, supra note 27, at 907 & n.81 (potential number of limita-
tion periods is "fifty times the number of possible characterizations" for a federal claim,
although not all states have the same number of characterizations).
140. Given the inconsistency in the present system litigants may find it difficult to predict
whether they will have a favorable limitation period. See supra text accompanying notes 90-
137.
141. Note, supra note 6, at 1139; Note, supra note 11, at 738-40.
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court system and the federal rules of procedure.1 42
In an effort to reduce forum shopping, many states have enacted borrow-
ing statutes that generally provide for the barring of an action if it would
have been time-barred in the state where the cause of action arose.' 43 If the
forum state has created a borrowing statute, then, under the traditional ap-
proach, the court will generally apply it.'44 To the extent that great dispari-
ties exist in the borrowing provisions of many states and that other states do
not possess such provisions, such a practice merely produces additional in-
consistency and unpredictability. 45 Moreover, if a court decides to borrow
a limitation period of a foreign state, the borrowing court must also deter-
mine whether to adopt that state's rules for tolling and other subsidiary is-
sues related to limitation periods.' 46
The resident plaintiff exception, which some states incorporate in their
borrowing provisions,' 47 only adds more confusion to the system.'48 Under
this exception the court will not apply a borrowing statute to an action
brought by the resident of the forum. 149 The rationale behind such a provi-
sion states that a forum has an interest in protecting its citizens and allowing
them to bring suits.150 This rationale, however, does not appear to apply to
actions brought under federally created rather than state created rights, at
least when the federal courts exercise exclusive jurisdiction.15 Such an ex-
ception merely creates more inconsistency and nonuniformity in the federal
courts. 152
Even if all states possessed borrowing statutes, the traditional approach
would still tend to discourage plaintiffs from filing in a state other than the
142. Note, supra note 11, at 738-40. Lack of uniformity by itself provides an insufficient
justification for judicial creation of a uniform law. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 104
(1971); UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 702-03 (1966).
143. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.10 (West 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-
210 (Smith-Hurd 1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-215 (1985). See generally A. CERVERA, THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN AMERICAN CONFLICTS OF LAW 169-76 (1966) (lists the various
borrowing statutes). Determining where the cause of action arose may be difficult in cases in
which elements of the cause of action occur in different states. Agency Holding Corp. v. Mal-
ley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2766, 97 L. Ed. 2d 121, 132 (1987).
144. Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 466-68 (1947).
145. A. CERVERA, supra note 143, at 81; Blume & George, supra note 36, at 994-95; Spe-
cial Project, supra note 2, at 1104. See generally Vernon, Statutes of Limitation in the Conflict
of Laws.: Borrowing Statutes, 32 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 287, 294-96 (1960) (classifies the bor-
rowing statutes of the various states and indicates which states do not have such provisions).
146. Devine v. Rook, 314 S.W.2d 932, 935 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958); Special Project, supra note
2, at 1099. For a discussion of the problems inherent in determining the sources for tolling
rules and other subsidiary rules, see supra note 92.
147. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 361 (West 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8121
(1974); IDAHO CODE § 5-239 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-45 (1977).
148. Vernon, supra note 145, at 311.
149. Figueroa v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 231 F. Supp. 168, 169-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Blume
& George, supra note 36, at 982-83; Special Project, supra note 2, at 1101-03.
150. Special Project, supra note 2, at 1101.
151. Hill, supra note 9, at 102 n.164; Special Project, supra note 2, at 1102-05. Moreover,
one commentary argues, "[I]f the purpose of the statute of limitations is to bar stale claims, it
is difficult to justify degrees of staleness depending upon the domicile of the claimant." Blume
& George, supra note 36, at 995.
152. Special Project, supra note 2, at 1101-05.
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one in which the cause of action arose, due to the reliance of borrowing
statutes on the forum state limitation periods. Generally, borrowing statutes
only provide for borrowing if the foreign state's limitation period runs
shorter than the forum's period. 153 Under such a system, if a cause of action
occurs in a state that has a long limitation period, the plaintiff cannot take
advantage of that period unless he files in that state or in a state that has a
longer limitation period. Given the federal nature of the claims, plaintiffs
suing under federal statutes should face the same limitation periods regard-
less of where they file suit.154
In summary, no legal mandate requires that federal courts use the state
borrowing approach. Instead, the use of such a rule basically arises from a
tradition that rests on a misinterpretation of the Rules of Decision Act.
155
Given the inconsistency problems inherent in the state borrowing approach
and that at times the courts have refused to follow state law, it is important
to analyze the alternatives that a federal court has if it decides not to borrow
forum state law.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE GENERAL APPROACH
The Supreme Court and commentators have suggested at least six alterna-
tives to the traditional state borrowing approach: 156 (1) use no limitation
period; 157 (2) apply the equitable doctrine of laches;158 (3) borrow a limita-
tion period from an analogous federal cause of action; 159 (4) use a general
federal statute of limitation; 160 (5) judicially create a statute of limitation; 16 1
or (6) use conflict-of-law principles. 162 Each of these alternatives contain
certain advantages and disadvantages. This section examines and evaluates
each of the options in light of the objectives behind limitation periods and
the problems inherent in the traditional state borrowing approach. Such an
analysis serves as a background for formulating general solutions to the
problem of determining limitation periods for federal statutes that do not
specify such periods.
153. Blume & George, supra note 36, at 995.
154. Hill, supra note 9, at 102; Blume & George, supra note 36, at 995.
155. Ingram v. Steven Robert Corp., 547 F.2d 1260, 1264 (5th Cir. 1977). The Fifth Cir-
cuit declared that the state borrowing rule is "neither rational nor historical, but purely prece-
dential." Id.
156. Another alternative that the courts could adopt is the twenty-year common-law pre-
sumption. See Note, supra note 11, at 744-45.
157. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 239-44 (1985); Note, supra
note 27, at 903-04; Note, supra note 6, at 1130-31.
158. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1946); Note, supra note 27, at 904;
Note, supra note 6, at 1141-46; Note, supra note 11, at 744.
159. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2767, 97 L.
Ed. 2d 121, 133-34 (1987); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169-
72 (1983); Note, supra note 27, at 914-18; Note, supra note 6, at 1133-34.
160. Note, supra note 6, at 1146.
161. Note, supra note 27, at 905; Note, supra note 6, at 1131-32.
162. Hill, supra note 9, at 102 n.164.
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A. No Limitation Period
Instead of adopting a state statute of limitation, a federal court could re-
fuse to apply any limitation period for statutes when Congress has not speci-
fied a period. 163 Except for actions brought by the federal government, 164 or
where Congress has specifically declared that no limitation period is applica-
ble,' 65 the Court appears reluctant to refuse the application of a limitation
period for a cause of action.166 In at least one case, however, the Supreme
Court has held that no limitation period should apply to a particular cause
of action.1 67 In County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation 168 Indian tribes
sued two New York counties. Their complaint alleged that a conveyance of
land by the ancestors of the Indians in 1795 was void since it violated the
Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1793.169 The tribes sought damages
based on the fair rental value of the land for the years 1968 and 1969. The
Court found that although in the usual practice courts adopted state limita-
tion periods when confronted with a federal action that did not specify a
limitation period, in this case the state limitation was inconsistent with the
general federal policy against limitation for Indian land claims. ' 70 Instead of
applying a limitation period from another source, the Court held that no
limitation period should apply to the action. 17 1
The no-limitation alternative offers several advantages. Such an approach
avoids the often harsh result arising from the denial of an otherwise valid
claim simply because the plaintiff did not bring suit before the expiration of
the limitation period. 172 Moreover, this alternative prevents arbitrary judi-
cial creation of limitation periods and could act as a catalyst for Congress to
establish limitation periods. 1 7 3 Finally, if all federal courts refused use of
limitation periods for federal statutes that do not contain such periods, the
courts could solve the problems of inconsistency and nonuniformity that
plague the state borrowing approach.
While the no-limitation period alternative does have these advantages, it
generally runs counter to the American system of law and is not likely to
163. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 239-44 (1985).
164. United States v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 364 U.S. 301, 308 (1960).
165. See 18 U.S.C. § 3281 (1982) (no time limitation on prosecution for capital criminal
offenses).
166. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Na-
tion, 470 U.S. 226, 256-58 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
167. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 239-44 (1985). Justice
Scalia has also contended that if no appropriate state limitation period exists, a court should
not apply any period. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 107 S. Ct. 2759,
2774, 97 L. Ed. 2d 121, 142 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
168. 470 U.S. 226 (1985).
169. Indian Trade & Intercourse Act, ch. 19, § 8, 1 Stat. 329 (1793).
170. Oneida, 470 U.S. at 239-44.
171. Id. The Court did not consider whether the equitable doctrine of laches could apply to
the case since the petitioners did not assert the defense on appeal. Id. at 244.
172. See Special Project, supra note 2, at 1015.
173. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2774, 97 L.
Ed. 2d 121, 143 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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become a widely used alternative. 174 American courts have long recognized
the important purposes behind limitation periods. 175 Such periods, although
they may appear harsh in any particular case, benefit society, the defendant,
and the judicial system.' 76 Moreover, given the long history of judicial reli-
ance on limitation periods, Congress likely did not intend by its failure to
include a limitation period for a given federal statute that a limitation period
should not exist under the federal act. 177
B. Doctrine of Laches
Given the judicial reluctance to omit any use of a limitation period, one
must analyze the alternatives to the state borrowing approach that do pro-
vide time limitations for federal causes of action. One such approach con-
sists of the use of laches.178 Similar to statutes of limitation, laches may
deny relief to a litigant who has delayed bringing his cause of action. 179 Un-
like statutory limitations, however, laches do not define specific time periods
in which a plaintiff must commence his suit. Instead, a court looks to equita-
ble considerations to determine whether the plaintiff has unreasonably
delayed bringing his action and, if so, if such delay prejudiced the
defendant. ' 80
Traditionally the Supreme Court has restricted the use of laches to suits in
equity. 18' In Holmberg v. Armbrecht 182 the Supreme Court declared that
the laches doctrine applied to actions arising under federal statutes when
Congress had not specified limitation periods and the only remedies were
traditionally in equity.' 83 In 1977 the Court seemed to indicate that the
laches doctrine could apply to legal as well as equitable actions.' 84 The
Court in Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC 18 5 refused to apply a statu-
tory limitation period to an action that the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission brought under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' 86 The
Court indicated however, that federal courts may bar such an action if de-
lays by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission significantly preju-
dice a defendant's ability to defend himself.' 87 Such a standard appears
174. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985); Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S.
610, 616-17 (1895).
175. Lewis v. Marshall, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 470, 477-78 (1831); Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 336, 342 (1805).
176. See supra notes 19-32 and accompanying text.
177. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703-04 (1966); Special Project, supra
note 2, at 1044-45.
178. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1946).
179. Id. at 396; Note, supra note 27, at 904.
180. Gardner v. Panama R.R., 342 U.S. 29, 31 (1951); Note, supra note 6, at 1141.
181. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 244 & n.16 (1985).
182. 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
183. Id. at 395-97.
184. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 373 (1977); Note, supra note 6, at
1140-46.
185. 432 U.S. 355 (1977).
186. Id. at 372.
187. Id. at 373.
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similar to the traditional laches defense.' 8 8 A recent Supreme Court case
suggests, however, that the Court has not resolved the issue of whether a
defendant may assert such a defense in an action at law.189
The important remaining question asks not whether courts may allow the
laches defense in legal as well as equitable actions, but whether the use of
laches provides an effective alternative to the state borrowing approach.
Such a determination must be made in light of the purposes of limitation
periods. While the use of the laches defense prevents some of the harsh re-
sults that occasionally arise in statute of limitation cases, such a discretion-
ary approach also undermines the principal objectives of limitation
periods. 190 The use of a case-by-case analysis for situations involving the
laches defense has the potential to create even greater inconsistency and
nonuniformity in the federal courts than exists now. 191 By failing to provide
a specific time period after which a claimant may no longer bring suit, the
laches defense deprives the defendant of his period of repose. 192 Similarly,
under laches, society is unable to predict with certainty when the claim
against an individual or property becomes invalid. 193 Finally, when com-
pared to statutes of limitation, the use of laches creates a burden on the court
system since the case-by-case approach requires added expenditure of a
court's limited resources. Under laches a court must determine not only
whether the plaintiff has unreasonably delayed, but also whether the delay
prejudiced the defendant's defense. 194
C. Borrow a Federal Limitation Period
In cases in which the federal statute does not specify a limitation period,
federal courts could borrow a time restriction from a related federal, rather
than a state, cause of action.195 The Supreme Court has resorted to this fed-
eral borrowing approach in at least three cases. 196 In McAllister v. Magnolia
Petroleum Co. 197 the Court applied a federal limitation period to an unsea-
worthiness claim under general admiralty law that did not specify a limita-
tion period.' 98 In this case the plaintiff, a crew member of a ship, sought
damages for injuries suffered when he fell down a stairway on the ship. He
188. Note, supra note 6, at 1141-46.
189. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 244 & n.16 (1985) ("appli-
cation of the equitable defense of laches in an action at law would be novel indeed.").
190. Note, supra note 6, at 1143-44.
191. Note, supra note 27, at 904.
192. Note, supra note 6, at 1143-44.
193. Id.
194. Gardner v. Panama R.R., 342 U.S. 29, 31 (1951); Note, supra note 6, at 1143-44.
195. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169-72 (1983); Note,
supra note 27, at 914-18; Note, supra note 6, at 1133-34.
196. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2767, 97 L.
Ed. 2d 121, 133-34 (1987); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169-
72 (1983); McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 225-26 (1958). One commen-
tator has suggested that in implied federal causes of action, the justification for the federal
borrowing approach appears stronger since Congress has not had the chance to consider set-
ting limitation periods. Note, supra note 6, at 1133-34.
197. 357 U.S. 221 (1958).
198. Id. at 225.
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filed suit under the Jones Act' 99 for negligence and under general maritime
law for unseaworthiness. The Court chose to apply the federal limitation
period specified in the Jones Act to the unseaworthiness claim rather than
using a limitation period from an analogous state cause of action. 2°° The
Court reasoned that since the law required the plaintiff to file both actions in
the same suit, 20 application of a two-year state statute of limitation for the
unseaworthiness claim stood contrary to the congressional intent specified in
the three-year limitation period under the Jones Act.20 2
Similarly in DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters 203 the
Court borrowed a federal rather than a state limitation period. 2°4 The Court
held that the federal limitation period for making charges of unfair labor
practices to the National Labor Relations Board205 applies when employees
bring actions alleging a breach of a collective-bargaining agreement by an
employer and a breach of a duty of fair representation by a union. 20 6 The
Court declared that when federal law provides a better analogy than state
law, and the federal policies underlying the federal cause of action support
the use of this federal analogy, then the court may borrow an analogous
federal rather than state limitation period. 20 7
In Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc. 208 the Court
recently applied the analysis developed in DelCostello to the area of civil
enforcement actions for RICO violations.20 9 The Court held that a federal
act, the Clayton Act, 210 which contains a limitation period, represents a bet-
ter analogy than any available state cause of action.211 The Court reasoned
that the many similarities between RICO and the Clayton Act, as well as the
need for a uniform federal limitation period due to the often multistate na-
ture of RICO claims, which create uncertainty, expensive litigation, and the
danger of forum shopping, supported the uniform application of the limita-
tion period in the Clayton Act to all civil RICO causes of action. 212
The use of a federal borrowing approach potentially may eliminate many
of the disadvantages of the state borrowing approach. One major criticism of
the state borrowing method for federal causes of action argues that states do
not develop their limitation periods based on national interests. 213 Congress,
199. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982). The Jones Act contains a three-year limitation period. Id.
200. McAllister, 357 U.S. at 225-26.
201. Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 321-22 (1927).
202. McAllister, 357 U.S. at 224-26.
203. 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
204. Id. at 169-72.
205. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982).
206. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 169-72.
207. Id. at 171-72.
208. 107 S. Ct. 2759, 97 L. Ed. 2d 121 (1987).
209. Id. at 2762-64; 97 L. Ed. 2d at 128-30.
210. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
211. Malley-Duff, 107 S. Ct. at 2764, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 130.
212. Id. at 2764-67, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 130-34. The Court recognized that "the federal policies
that lie behind RICO and the practicalities of RICO litigation" support the adoption of a
uniform federal limitation period. Id. at 2767, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 134.
213. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977).
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on the other hand, considers national concerns when formulating federal
statutes. The use of a limitation period from a related federal cause of ac-
tion, therefore, might tend to reflect federal policy concerns more accu-
rately. 2 14 Moreover, the Supreme Court could solve the problems of
inconsistency and nonuniformity for any particular federal cause of action
by declaring that a limitation period from an analogous federal statute
should apply. 2 15 While the federal borrowing approach contains these poten-
tial advantages, it also possesses several limitations. Borrowing from analo-
gous federal statutes will solve the nonuniformity and inconsistency
problems only if the Supreme Court makes the selection of the particular
analogous federal statute.2 16 If the choice is left solely to the lower courts
then, as under the state borrowing approach, different characterizations of
the same cause of action could result in the borrowing of different federal
limitation periods. 2 17 The major problem with the federal borrowing ap-
proach arises when an analogous federal cause of action does not exist. Even
if such a cause of action does exist, given the many federal statutes that do
not specify limitation periods, courts may be unable to find federal limitation
periods to borrow.218
D. General Federal Statute of Limitation
Under the state borrowing approach, a court solves the problem of not
finding an analogous state claim from which to borrow a limitation period
by adopting the state's general statute of limitation period. Such a catch-all
provision enables the court to apply a limitation period to any cause of ac-
tion.2 19 Given the utility of general limitation periods, the next alternative
to consider is whether the federal courts could adopt a general federal stat-
ute of limitation to apply in actions when no close federal analogies exist. A
214. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 172 (1983).
215. Note, A Limitation on Actions, supra note 118, at 773.
216. Cf Note, supra note 27, at 905 (only have consistency if Supreme Court chooses uni-
form limitation period).
217. The federal, as opposed to the state, borrowing approach may reduce inconsistencies
because courts may select from fewer federal limitation periods. Moreover, under the federal
approach the federal courts would be looking under the same federal law for any given cause of
action, whereas in the state approach each forum state would look at its own source law. On
the other hand, the federal approach may increase inconsistencies because, unlike in many of
the states, there remains no general federal statute of limitation to which the court may refer if
no close state analogy exists. See Special Project, supra note 2, at 1081. Justice Scalia has also
argued that selecting appropriate federal limitation periods may be more difficult than select-
ing state limitation periods, as federal limitation periods apply to particular federal statutes
while many state limitation periods apply to general categories of actions such as contract
actions. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff& Assocs., Inc., 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2773-74, 97 L.
Ed. 2d 121, 141-42 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
218. Special Project, supra note 2, at 1081. In selecting a limitation period from a particu-
lar federal statute, a court must also determine whether to adopt any subsidiary rules that the
statute contains. West v. Conrail, 107 S. Ct. 1538, 1541-42, 95 L. Ed. 2d 32, 37-38 (1987). In
West the Court selected the limitation period from an analogous federal statute, but declined to
follow the statute's related service provisions by stating that the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure provided service rules and that in borrowing limitation periods the courts may "borrow
no more than necessary" to "close interstices in federal law." Id. at 1542, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 38.
219. Special Project, supra note 2, at 1081.
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general statute of limitation defines limitation periods for "all actions and
proceedings within broad classes established by the statute. ' 220 Several
commentators have suggested the use of such limitation periods for federal
actions that do not specify limitation periods.221 While such an approach
would create uniformity in the federal system, at least one scholar has ar-
gued that different federal causes of actions should have different limitation
periods.222
Presently, beyond a few limited exceptions, 223 no such general federal
statutes of limitation exist for civil actions. 224 Section 2462 of title 28225 had
potential as a general statute of limitation, but the Supreme Court has con-
strued the statute narrowly.226 Given the fact that Congress has not enacted
any general limitation provisions since section 2462, and that it continues to
enact federal statutes without limitation periods, Congress appears unlikely
to adopt a general statute of limitation. 227 The next question is whether the
courts could adopt such a general limitation period. 228 This question is part
of a much larger issue dealing with whether the courts may judicially create
a limitation period when Congress has not provided for such a period in the
statute.
E. A Judicially Created Limitation Period
The fifth alternative available to a court when confronted with a federal
statute that does not specify a limitation period is simply to invent an appli-
cable period judicially. 229 Judicial creation of uniform limitation periods has
the potential to solve the problems of nonuniformity and inconsistency in-
herent in the state borrowing approach. 230 Such a solution will not occur,
however, unless the Supreme Court selects the limitation periods. 23' If
lower courts are free to create limitation periods, inconsistency and
220. 5 F. POORE & E. KOEBER, supra note 3, § 15.519.
221. Note, A Limitation on Actions, supra note 118, at 771; Note, supra note 6, at 1146-47;
Note, A Call for Uniformity, supra note 118, at 73-74.
222. Developments in the Law, supra note 21, at 1267-68; cf. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S.
261, 280-87 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (Court should not adopt a uniform characteriza-
tion for all § 1983 actions).
223. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (1982) (actions against the United States); id. §§ 2415-2416
(1982 & Supp. III 1985) (certain actions by the United States); id. § 2462 (1982) (actions for
penalties, fines, or forfeitures).
224. 5 F. POORE & E. KOEBER, supra note 3, § 15.519. For noncapital criminal offenses,
Congress has provided a general limitation period of five years. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1982).
225. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1982) provides: "Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress,
an action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecu-
niary or otherwise, shall not be entertained unless commenced within five years from the date
when the claim first accrued ... ." Id.
226. See, e.g., Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 236 U.S. 412, 423 (1915) (limit to recoveries
for violations of public laws); O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 322-25 (1914) (not apply to
remedial actions); Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148, 155-58 (1899) (limit to penal actions).
227. Note, supra note 6, at 1146-47.
228. Note, A Limitation on Actions, supra note 118, at 773; Note, supra note 6, at 1146-47.
229. Note, supra note 27, at 905; Note, supra note 6, at 1131-32.
230. Note, A Limitation on Actions, supra note 118, at 773; Note, A Call for Uniformity,
supra note 118, at 73-74.
231. Note, supra note 27, at 905.
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nonuniformity will still exist in the system. Moreover, such an approach
could aggravate the problems of the present approach. Currently, litigants
can predict that the courts will most likely use the state borrowing approach.
Although litigants have to guess what particular state law will apply, they at
least know the probable sources of the limitation period. The lower courts'
choices or creations of any limitation periods for given federal causes of ac-
tion will restrict the ability of litigants to predict such periods.232
Despite the potential for uniformity inherent in the Supreme Court crea-
tion of limitation periods, the Court has appeared reluctant to invent limita-
tion periods for federal statutes that do not specify such periods.233 In the
vast majority of cases the Court does not even discuss this option. Instead,
the Court's usual approach considers congressional silence in not providing
a limitation period as a reflection of congressional intent that the courts
should follow their traditional practice of borrowing limitation periods from
the forum state.234 In UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp. 235 a union requested
that the Court adopt a uniform limitation period for suits arising under sec-
tion 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.236 The Court refused to
create such a period on the basis that judicial invention stood contrary to
congressional intent. 237 Moreover, the Court added that while the use of the
state borrowing approach would preclude uniformity, the need for such uni-
formity in this case did not justify judicial legislation.238
F. Conflict-of-Law Principles
A final alternative to the state borrowing approach advocates the use of
uniform conflict-of-law principles to determine which state law should apply
when the relevant facts occur outside the forum state. 239 Under the tradi-
tional state borrowing approach a federal court looks to the forum's choice
232. Id.
233. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 104 (1971); UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp.,
383 U.S. 696, 703-04 (1966); Note, supra note 11, at 745.
234. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703-04 (1966). The Court held that if
Congress disagrees with the selection of limitation periods then it can enact a uniform federal
period, as Congress did in the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 286 (1982). Hoosier, 383 U.S. at 704.
235. 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
236. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
237. Hoosier, 383 U.S. at 703-04.
238. Id. at 701-05. The Court did indicate that certain cases might require judicial creation
of a limitation period. Id. at 701; see Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 104 (1971) ("A
special federal statute of limitations is created, as a matter of federal common law, only when
the need for uniformity is particularly great or when the nature of the federal right demands a
particular sort of statute of limitations."). Dissenting in Hoosier, Justice White argued that
courts in the past created limitation periods, and that the real issue in the case was whether to
create one uniform period or fifty separate periods. Hoosier, 383 U.S. at 713 (White, J., dissent-
ing). White suggested that the Court adopt a single limitation period based on relevant federal
and state statutes. Id. at 713-14. Others have suggested that the creation of limitation periods
is essentially a legislative function allocated to Congress. Under such a theory the courts may
not create limitation periods because neither Congress nor the Constitution has delegated this
power to the courts. McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 234 (1958) (Whit-
taker, J., dissenting); Note, supra note 6, at 1132.
239. Hill, supra note 9, at 102 n.164.
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of limitation periods. 240 If the forum has enacted a borrowing statute, the
court may be able to adopt a limitation period of a foreign state.24' In many
cases, however, the borrowing statute will not allow adoption of the foreign
state provision if the foreign provision runs longer than the forum's period,
or if the plaintiff resides in the forum state. 242 The fact that different states
have different borrowing provisions while some states do not have such pro-
visions merely adds inconsistency to the traditional approach.24 3
A more fundamental question than whether the courts should adopt fo-
rum state borrowing statutes is whether the federal courts may bypass the
forum state's law and look directly to the limitation periods of the state or
states where the cause of action arose. The Supreme Court has never de-
clared that the courts must adopt the forum's choice of limitation periods in
federal actions arising outside the forum state. 244 In fact, in UAW v. Hoosier
Cardinal Corp. 245 the Court appeared to reserve this question for future
review.246
In Kellermyer v. Blue Flame Gas Corp. 247 the Supreme Court had an op-
portunity to resolve this question, but denied the petition for certiorari. In
Kellermyer the plaintiff brought suit in Texas for a federal cause of action
under the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act.248 The act does not con-
tain a limitation period, and all of the relevant events, except for the filing of
the complaint, occurred in Indiana and Ohio. The district court and the
Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals applied the limitation period of the
forum state.24 9 Given that the choice of a federal statute of limitation ulti-
mately becomes a federal question, 250 federal law principles should govern
the selection of either the law of the forum state or the law of the state where
all the relevant events occurred. 25 1 Adoption of a rule applying the limita-
tion period of the state where the cause of action arose appears in accord
240. See Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 616-19 (1895).
241. See supra notes 143-144 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 147-153 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
244. See H. HART & H. WESCHLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
829 n.7 (2d ed. 1973); Hill, supra note 9, at 80.
245. 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
246. Id. at 705 n.8. In a footnote the Court found "no occasion to consider whether such a
choice of law should be made in accord with the principle of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Mfg. Co.,
313 U.S. 487, or by operation of a different federal conflict of laws rule." Id.
247. 797 F.2d.983 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 575, 93 L. Ed. 2d 578
(1986).
248. 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-760(h) (1982).
249. Kellermyer, 797 F.2d at 985-86. The court found that application of a statute of limi-
tation in an action at law occurs as a procedural matter, and thus the law of the forum should
control. Id. at 985. The court also asserted that the longer Indiana limitation period would be
more likely to interfere with the federal policies underlying the federal statute than the shorter
Texas limitation period. Id. at 986.
250. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 159 n.13 (1983).
251. But see Kellermyer, 797 F.2d at 985 (if classify statutes of limitation as procedural
then forum rule should apply). Commentators, however, have criticized the proce-
dure/substantive distinction. A full discussion of this distinction falls beyond the scope of this
Comment. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-10 (1945); A. CERVERA, supra
note 143, at 4-8; Vernon, supra note 145, at 288-93.
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with the reasonable expectations of the parties involved. 252 Such an ap-
proach, therefore, potentially supports the purposes underlying limitation
periods. 253 Moreover, the approach would create uniformity in the federal
court system since litigants could expect equal limitation periods for their
federal causes of action, irrespective of where plaintiffs file suit. 254 The con-
flict-of-laws approach would help solve some of the inconsistencies that arise
in cases in which the relevant facts occur outside the forum state. Such an
approach, however, is simply another type of a state borrowing approach
and thus is subject to the problems inherent in the general approach. Such
problems include nonuniformity between states and inconsistency within
states arising from federal courts' inconsistent characterizations. 255 More-
over, such an approach could lead to an added expenditure of judicial re-
sources to determine the applicable state law. Instead of having a rule that
simply requires borrowing from the forum state, the conflict-of-laws ap-
proach would require the courts to choose the state whose law should apply
to the cause of action and then select the applicable law from that state.
Courts could find difficulty in administering the conflict-of-law approach in
cases in which different elements of a cause of action occur in different
states.2
56
V. PROPOSALS TO INCREASE UNIFORMITY AND CONSISTENCY
The traditional approach to defining limitation periods for federal statutes
that do not specify such periods has merely created uncertainty and
nonuniformity in the present system. Congress may alleviate these problems
by enacting specific limitation periods for each federal statute. Such a system
would bind federal courts to specific limitation periods and in doing so en-
sure uniformity and predictability within the system.257 These congres-
sionally supplied limitation periods would control over any conflicting state
periods. 25 8 In light of over 150 years of the state borrowing approach, and
the continuing reluctance of Congress to specify limitation periods for many
federal statutes, however, Congress is not likely to enact specific federal limi-
tation periods for all statutes. 259
A more realistic alternative to the enactment of a specific limitation period
for each federal statute that does not specify such a period is for Congress to
enact a general limitation period for such statutes.260 Such an approach also
252. Hill, supra note 9, at 102 n.164.
253. See supra notes 19-32 and accompanying text.
254. Blume & George, supra note 36, at 995; Special Project, supra note 2, at 1104-05.
255. In addition, the problem of determining the source of law for subsidiary issues such as
tolling would still exist under the conflicts of law approach. For a discussion of the determina-
tion of the choice of law for subsidiary issues, see supra note 92.
256. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2766, 97
L. Ed. 2d 121, 132 (1987).
257. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
259. Special Project, supra note 2, at 1105.
260. Blume & George, supra note 36, at 992-93; Special Project, supra note 2, at 1105;
Note, supra note 6, at 1146-47; Note, supra note I1, at 745.
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would foster uniformity and certainty in the federal court system. A disad-
vantage of such an approach arises in that different causes of action may
deserve different limitation periods. 26 1 If Congress disagreed with the appli-
cation of the general limitation period to a specific federal cause of action,
however, it could always enact a specific limitation period for that particular
action. 262 Nearly two hundred years ago Congress enacted a seemingly gen-
eral limitation period, 263 but the courts construed it narrowly. 264 Given that
Congress has not responded since these cases occurred over seventy years
ago, Congress apparently will not adopt such an approach now. 265
If Congress will not take steps to solve the problems of inconsistency and
uniformity in the federal courts, then the courts should provide guidance in
this area. 266 In light of congressional reluctance to mandate specific or gen-
eral limitation periods for federal acts, judicial invention of limitation peri-
ods would probably violate legislative intent, and others may construe such
invention as an unconstitutional act of lawmaking.267 The courts have re-
luctantly used such an approach in the past, and give no clear indications
that they intend to change their course of action.268 The courts appear will-
ing, however, to accept a uniform federal limitation period provided that a
federal analogue and a need for uniformity exist. 269 Such a rule depends on
the availability of analogous federal statutes that contain limitation periods.
Given that Congress appears unlikely to adopt uniform limitation periods,
and that the courts may not find analogous federal statutes, alternatives do
exist to bring more certainty to the present system. First of all, the Supreme
Court should extend its analysis developed in Wilson v. Garcia 2 70 and
Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc.271 to other cases. In
Garcia the Court adopted a uniform characterization system for federal
causes of action. 272 While such an approach does not solve the problems of
differences between states, the approach potentially creates predictability
within the circuits and consistency within the states. Even if uniform charac-
terization for federal causes of actions existed, however, the circuit courts
might not adopt consistent characterizations in all cases. Inconsistency
could still thrive in cases when relevant factors occur outside the forum
states. The source of uncertainty in these cases is inconsistent borrowing
261. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
262. See supra note 234.
263. Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 89, 1 Stat. 627, 696 (1799) (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2462 (1982)).
264. See supra note 226.
265. Note, supra note 6, at 1146-47.
266. Note, A Limitation on Actions, supra note 118, at 773.
267. See supra notes 233-238 and accompanying text.
268. See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158-62 (1983) (al-
ternatives to state borrowing approach consist of borrowing related federal limitation periods
or applying equitable principles such as laches).
269. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2767, 97 L.
Ed. 2d 121, 133-34 (1987); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169-
72 (1983).
270. 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
271. 107 S. Ct. 2759, 97 L. Ed. 2d 121 (1987).
272. 471 U.S. at 271-76.
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provisions in the various states. To solve these problems, the federal courts
should adopt uniform conflict-of-law principles, 273 or adopt a single federal
limitation period for each cause of action as in Malley-Duff2 7 4 Under these
principles, the federal courts would not treat parties differently merely be-
cause they filed in a different forum state. Plaintiffs suing in federal court
under the same federal statute should receive equal treatment.
By applying uniform characterization rules and conflict-of-law principles,
courts could dramatically decrease the uncertainty and inconsistency in the
present system.275 The reduction in litigation by the application of uniform
characterization rules should outweigh the increase in litigation due to use of
conflict-of-law principles. Under such a system of uniform characterization
and conflict-of-law principles, while courts might not treat litigants in differ-
ent states similarly, at least consistency would exist within the states. More
importantly, parties as well as society and the judicial system could predict
with more confidence than under the present system the applicable limita-
tion period for a given federal cause of action. Such an approach appears
essential to the objectives behind limitation periods.
VI. CONCLUSION
Given that Congress often enacts statutes without specifying limitation
periods, courts frequently must decide whether to adopt limitation periods
for these actions, and if so, what should be the source of such periods. Rec-
ognizing the importance of limitation periods to defendants, society, and the
judicial system, the courts rarely fail to supply a limitation period for a cause
of action. The traditional approach allows courts to adopt a limitation pe-
riod from the forum state or a foreign state under a borrowing statute, unless
such a period conflicts with the federal policy underlying the federal statute.
Theoretically, such an approach establishes a straightforward procedure for
courts to determine limitation periods for federal causes of action when stat-
utes do not specify such periods. In practice, however, such an approach
produces inconsistency and nonuniformity. Different states possess different
limitation periods and, more importantly, courts inconsistently characterize
federal causes of action. Moreover, when relevant facts occur outside the
forum state the traditional approach's reliance on forum state rules and in-
consistent borrowing provisions adds to the uncertainty in the present sys-
tem. As a result, courts in different, as well as the same, states apply different
limitation periods to the same federal cause of action.
This Comment has presented and evaluated several alternatives to the
traditional approach. Each consists of several advantages and disadvantages
that courts should consider when invoking these alternatives. In addition,
273. Cf A. CERVERA, supra note 143, at 134-36 (suggests adoption of uniform borrowing
statute); Blume & George, supra note 36, at 994-95 (same); Vernon, supra note 145, at 323-28
(same).
274. Malley-Duff, 107 S. Ct. at 2767, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 133-34.
275. Problems with respect to the adoption of subsidiary issues related to limitation periods
would still remain unless the Supreme Court formulates a predictable approach to resolving
such issues. See supra notes 92 & 218.
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the Comment has suggested methods to increase uniformity and consistency
within the federal courts. The optimal solution requires congressional limita-
tion periods. If Congress fails to supply such periods, then the Supreme
Court should adopt either specific or general limitation periods. Some com-
mentators and legislators may deem judicial creation of such periods uncon-
stitutional or violative of legislative intent. Beyond these drastic approaches,
the Comment has suggested methods of improving consistency within the
traditional borrowing approach. Adoption of uniform characterization rules
and uniform conflict-of-law principles would help eliminate much of the un-
necessary inconsistency and uncertainty under the present approach.

